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The 35th anniversary of New Zealand establishing diplomatic relations with 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) fell on 22 December 2007. This 
anniversary was marked by high-powered celebrations in both Beijing and 
Wellington. Yet, it should not be forgotten that New Zealand-China relations 
stretch much longer than the 35 years of formal relations with the PRC. There 
is a saying in Chinese, “when drinking water, think of its source” (yin shui si 
yuan), and in this paper I will survey some of the historical sources of New 
Zealand’s current close interest in, and involvement with, China. New 
Zealand has long had an extensive and complex relationship with China. The 
diversity of these long-term connections has resulted in an unusually high 
level of awareness of China and its people in New Zealand, and a strong 
interest in expanding the relationship still further. Another saying is also 
useful as a framework for understanding New Zealand-China relations: “seek 
common points; face up to differences.” China’s rising dominance in the 
Asia-Pacific region in recent years has brought about a significant re-
adjustment in New Zealand’s foreign policy, one which the New Zealand 
population appears ill-prepared to adjust to and which poses a number of 
challenges for the future. In the second half of the paper, I will discuss some 
of the points New Zealand has in common with China, along with some of 
the differences.  
 
 
Early Contacts  
 
New Zealand-China trade began as early as 1792, when sealing gangs landed 
on New Zealand shores to harvest sealskins for consumers in China. Within 
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20 years, these gangs virtually wiped out New Zealand’s seal population; 
which could perhaps serve as a cautionary tale to those who currently extol 
the advantages that trading with the vast Chinese market could bring to the 
New Zealand economy. When the sealskin trade stopped, other trade 
continued, such as the export of jade, timber, and later gold, fungus and scrap 
iron. In time, trade became two-way, with New Zealand importing Chinese 
tea, spices, fabrics and oils.2 
The discovery of gold in Otago in 1861 led to the beginning of Chinese 
migration to New Zealand, albeit extremely controlled. The debate over the 
Chinese presence in New Zealand after 1866 contributed to forging an 
emergent sense of national identity. As historian Nigel Murphy has argued, 
defining the early Chinese residents in New Zealand as “Other” led to a 
recognition of who exactly were “New Zealanders”.3 It should be noted that, 
according to the research of many social scientists specialising in this area, 
the definition of the New Zealand Chinese as “Other” is not yet completely 
resolved in New Zealand’s modern-day multicultural society.4    
New Zealand is a society with a strong tradition of Christian 
missionary work. From 1898, the New Zealand Presbyterian Church set up 
the Canton Villages Mission in Guangdong, China. This mission built on 
existing links between New Zealand missionaries and Chinese gold miners 
from Guangdong Province. As well as proselytising, the mission did valuable 
work expanding health care services into rural Guangdong and providing 
educational opportunities to the poor.5 New Zealanders also contributed a 
considerable number of missionaries to the Chinese Inland Mission (CIM), 
the London-based organisation which promoted Protestantism in China. In 
1934, a Guizhou-based, New Zealand CIM missionary, Arnolis Hayman, 
who lived in China from 1913-1945 and spoke fluent Mandarin and Miao 
dialect, was captured and held for ransom by the 6th Army Corps of the 
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Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Army (commonly known as the Red Army). 
This army was one of the forces engaged in what we now know as the Long 
March, the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) trek from its southern bases to 
the northwest of China (1934-1936). Hayman nearly died from his 
experiences, and his unpublished memoirs give a fascinating and candid 
insight into some of the leading figures of the CCP and the extreme methods 
they used to further their goals. Hayman’s capture by “Red bandits” was 
well-publicised in the papers of the day and added to New Zealand awareness 
of China’s plight in the Republican era.6  
New Zealand Catholics were also heavily involved in supporting 
Catholic missionary activity in China through the Franciscans and other such 
organisations. Much as the size of the Chinese economy was an object of 
desire for many exporters, so too did the Chinese market for souls attract 
much attention. China was believed to have a “great need” for salvation. New 
Zealand Christians, though in world terms relatively small in number, made a 
considerable contribution to this crusade. This contribution continued until 
1951, when the PRC explicitly prohibited the work of foreign missions in 
China and cut off foreign aid.7 After this period, New Zealand missionaries 
and their supporters re-directed their attention to Hong Kong and Taiwan, 
while keeping a close eye on opportunities to further the church in the PRC.  
There was another sort of New Zealander altogether who was attracted 
to China in the pre-1949 period: those whom I will call “adventurers”. These 
were people who went to China not for political or religious reasons, but to 
seek adventure. Among such figures I would count: Rewi Alley, who first 
went to China in 1927 to join a war (he hoped to get a job as a foreign 
mercenary fighting against the Northern Expedition) and eventually ended up 
as a world-renowned figure—first for his involvement in implementing 
industrial safety standards in Shanghai, and then for his key role in relief 
efforts and the Chinese cooperative movement—8 Iris Wilkinson (who used 
the pen name Robin Hyde), the New Zealand journalist and novelist who 
went to China in 1938 and wrote vivid and moving accounts of the Japanese 
attack on Xuzhou;9 and James Bertram, a New Zealand Rhodes scholar who 
eventually became a propagandist for the CCP during the 1936 Xian Incident 
and whose interview with Mao is cited in Quotations from Mao Zedong 
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(more commonly known as the Little Red Book).10 There are many others not 
so famous, but all contributed to New Zealanders’ awareness, sympathy, and 
understanding of the problems China faced in the pre-1949 era.  
 
 
Cold War Period 
 
In late 1949, as a result of strong awareness of the problems China faced and 
sympathies with its needs, New Zealand diplomats advocated recognising the 
new PRC government.11 However, while this was the New Zealand position 
(and throughout the Cold War period both the National and Labour parties 
supported this),12 the decision was made to hold off on the immediate 
establishment of relations for some time, as the Chinese Civil War was by no 
means concluded. However, after China entered the Korean War in October 
1950, the question as to the actual date of New Zealand’s recognition of the 
PRC was put on hold. As a punishment for China’s involvement in the war, 
the US vetoed any more of its close allies establishing diplomatic relations 
with the PRC (the United Kingdom had established diplomatic relations 
before the war broke out)13 and also ordered a trade blockade on China.14 
Wellington complied with both policies, and publicly supported the US 
position, but other government policies such as on New Zealand citizens 
visiting China, the early resumption of New Zealand-China trade and the 
official attitude towards the Chinese in New Zealand show that there was 
considerable divergence between the New Zealand position on China and that 
of the United States during the Cold War era.  
The New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs file on the issue of the 
recognition of China is 38 folders thick and dates from 1949 to 1972. The 
recognition of China was a topic of considerable debate in New Zealand in 
the Cold War years, and many New Zealand politicians, diplomats, and 
ordinary New Zealanders were openly frustrated with lack of progress on the 
                                           
10 See James Bertram, Capes of China Slide Away: A Memoir of Peace and War, 1910-
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12 In 1953, the National government’s Minister for External Affairs, T. Clifton Webb, met 
with the US ambassador to New Zealand to urge the US not to delay the recognition of the 
People’s Republic of China. Following the meeting, a foreign ministry memo reported that 
the “US government earnestly hopes that the question of Chinese representation in UN 
bodies will not be raised by countries outside the Soviet bloc.” 15 June 1953, Meeting 
between Ambassador Scott and Minister of External Affairs, T. Clifton Webb, PM 
264/3/14, NA.  
13 Extract from New Zealand record of discussions on the Pacific Pact, 6 August 1952, PM 
264/4/2, NA. 
14 See 111/31/6 part 1, NA. 
New Zealand-China Relations 
 
5 
 
matter. In 1956, a Prime Minister’s Department memo commented that the 
New Zealand public seemed ready to recognise China “at any time the 
government wishes to accord it.”15 Nonetheless, despite public pressure, the 
advice of New Zealand diplomats prevailed. They argued that, on this 
question, the attitude of the US was the most important factor. New Zealand 
could not recognise the PRC until its most important ally did so; otherwise it 
risked jeopardising the hard-won ties established between New Zealand and 
the US since WWII.16 
One way in which the New Zealand government could indicate its 
opposition to the US policies on the PRC was in matters such as trade and 
immigration. In 1956, New Zealand was one of the first Western countries to 
lift its economic embargo on China. In 1958, a New Zealand Ministry of 
Industry and Commerce official paid a secret visit to China to try to boost 
Sino-New Zealand trade.17 From the late 1950s on, New Zealand traders 
developed a substantial (for New Zealand) trade in wool, tallow, and skins, 
and imported an equivalent amount of Chinese goods.  
Unlike its Western allies, New Zealand did not prohibit its citizens 
from travelling to the PRC,18 and they also allowed PRC citizens, including 
some senior CCP officials, to visit New Zealand. Rewi Alley, who had 
chosen to stay on in the PRC after 1949 and was an open advocate for the 
policies of the new government, soon began to attract negative attention from 
the US government for his views and activities.19 New Zealand was under 
pressure to “control” him in some way, but ignored these demands and 
facilitated the renewal of Alley’s New Zealand travel documents and invited 
him to give (secret) briefings on China to diplomats and politicians when he 
visited New Zealand in 1960, 1971, and 1972. Most of Rewi Alley’s more 
than sixty books promoting “New China” were published by the Caxton 
Press, a leading New Zealand publisher. Alley was also instrumental in 
founding the New Zealand-China Friendship Society, which helped to build 
                                           
15 “Communist China,” 18 July 1956, PM 264/3/14/1/11, New Zealand Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade Archives (hereafter MFAT). 
16 Memo, New Zealand Embassy, Washington, to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Wellington, 
10 November 1966, PM 264/3/14, NA. 
17 7 October 1958, report of visit, 58/11/4 part 1, NA. 
18  SEATO (South-East Asian Security Organization) Security and Anti-Subversion 
Measures, Travel to Communist Countries, Agenda Item 4, 23 September-27 October 
1960, PM 120/7/18 part 1, NA. 
19 “The Germ Warfare Campaign in New Zealand,” confidential report, Publicity and 
Information Division, Department of Tourism and Publicity, 30 April 1952, Marshall 
papers, 22/1, Alexander Turnbull Library; Alfred Kohlberg to L.K. Munro, New Zealand 
Ambassador, Washington, 19 January 1953, 104/264/9, MFAT. Kohlberg was a former 
China trader and close associate of US Senator Joe McCarthy. 
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support and awareness of the PRC in New Zealand, organised “prominent 
persons” delegations to China and encouraged cultural exchange activities.20   
Another factor in the surprisingly close links between New Zealand 
and the PRC in the Cold War era was the Communist Party of New Zealand 
(CPNZ). The CPNZ was the only Western communist party to follow the 
CCP line during the Sino-Soviet split. The CPNZ’s decision to support the 
CCP was influenced by a number of factors, including the views of Rewi 
Alley. Alley only joined the CPNZ in 1960, but he was in contact with the 
party well before then and his pro-PRC, anti-US statements featured 
prominently in the party’s paper, the People’s Voice. In 1963, the CPNZ 
officially announced its support for China’s viewpoint in the ideological 
conflict with the Soviet Union. This led to a dramatic increase in contacts 
between the two parties, including the CCP effectively subsidising the CPNZ 
for the next 15 years through subscribing to large quantities of the party 
newspaper and paying more than the going rate for the copies it bought. 
CPNZ officials and their families were also invited on ‘all expenses paid’ 
trips to China and given free medical care and other services in return for 
their support. CPNZ leader Victor Wilcox’s pro-CCP speeches were 
translated into Chinese and widely promoted in China. In the 1960s and 
1970s he was one of the most well known foreigners in the PRC, and he met 
regularly with Mao Zedong and other senior leaders on his visits there.  
The CPNZ already had a special relationship with the CCP in any case, 
due to its location in China’s designated area of regional influence, the Asia-
Pacific. In a 1949 meeting in Moscow, the CCP was assigned the task of 
giving support to communist parties, trade unionists, and peace activists in 
the Asia-Pacific region.21 From this date, and until 1978 when China changed 
its foreign policy, New Zealand was within China’s zone of responsibility for 
fostering world revolution. This connection, and the special relationship 
between the CCP and the CPNZ, is demonstrated by a “Revolutionary Map 
of the World,” published in People’s Daily on 22 May 1971, which shows 
New Zealand as a centre of “revolutionary mass movements.”22 From the 
early 1950s, a number of CPNZ activists travelled to China for training in a 
secret international guerrilla school in Beijing, where they learned how to 
conduct guerrilla warfare and deepened their theoretical knowledge.23 From 
                                           
20 See Anne-Marie Brady, Friend of China—the Myth of Rewi Alley, London: 
RoutledgeCurzon, 2002. 
21 This was proposed during Liu Shaoqi’s meetings with Stalin in the summer of 1949. See 
Ivan Kovalev, “The Stalin-Mao Dialogue,” Far Eastern Affairs, No. 2 (1992), p. 97. 
22 The map is reproduced in Franz Schurmann, David Milton ed., The China Reader, vol. 
4, New York: Random House, 1974, p. 474. 
23 Eric Aarons, What’s Left? Memoirs of an Australian Communist, Sydney: Penguin 
Books Australia, 1993, p. 92. Eric Aarons, phone interview, 9 January 2002. I have been 
able to identify a number of New Zealand participants in the schools, but for privacy 
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my research into the archives, it appears that the governments of the day were 
unaware of this particular activity. 
The CPNZ was never important politically in New Zealand, though 
leading figures had prominent roles in both the trade unions and front 
organisations, such as the New Zealand-China Friendship Society and the 
peace movement. Membership of the CPNZ peaked at 1,500 in 1943; in 1952 
the number of members was between 800 and 1,000. There was a 
considerable annual turnover of members and a core membership of a mere 
50 individuals. Through the use of informants, agents and other surveillance 
activities, the New Zealand government was aware of how slight a risk it 
posed to New Zealand’s security. New Zealand was required by its 
membership of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation to report back 
annually on communist subversion in New Zealand, but in 1960 Wellington 
asked for the section on New Zealand to be removed; in their estimation there 
was no such threat.24 
Of potentially more cause for concern to the government than the 
CPNZ was the potential for the local Chinese population to become a pro-
PRC fifth column. Yet, like the requirement to provide information on the 
communist threat in New Zealand, this reflected the fears of New Zealand’s 
neighbours and allies rather than the realities of the New Zealand situation. 
Prompted by such concerns, New Zealand security officials kept a watchful 
eye on the political activities of the local Chinese community, but saw little 
cause for worry. With only a few exceptions, the Chinese community in New 
Zealand was neither pro-CCP nor pro-PRC in the Cold War period, even if 
they were not necessarily pro-Guomindang or pro-Republic of China.25  
 
 
“Watching the China Watchers”: New Zealand, the US, and China 
 
US government policy on China in the Cold War era had a profound impact 
on New Zealand’s policies towards the PRC. Indeed, one of New Zealand’s 
earliest China-specialist diplomats, Bryce Harland, actually described his 
main task as “watching the China watchers,” that is, keeping a close eye on 
the views of US-China specialists in the State Department and academia.26 
US-China relations were “a subject of direct interest to New Zealand,”27 
                                                                                                                               
reasons I will not name them. Most are dead now; one whom I was able to contact refused 
to discuss his time at the school and appeared shocked that his secret had been revealed. 
24 “Agenda Item 2(a): the Subversion and Insurgent Threat to the Treaty Area,” 25 
November 1960, PM 120/7/14, NA. 
25 US-Communist China Relations, Department of Police to Department of External 
Affairs, 6 November 1956, PM 264/2/2 part 7, NA.  
26 Bryce Harland, interview, 19 April 2002. 
27 Memo, 4 September 1956, PM 264/2/2, part 7, NA. 
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since they were such an integral element of US foreign policy in the Cold 
War era. New Zealand’s closest allies after 1952, Australia and the US, 
continually emphasised China’s threat to the security of the Asia-Pacific 
region. Australia and the US saw China, in association with the Soviet Union, 
as the main existing security concern in Asia. In contrast, New Zealand’s 
security analysts believed that the only potential challenge to New Zealand’s 
security was from the Soviet Union.28 Even then, the likelihood that New 
Zealand would be a direct victim of Soviet aggression was believed to be 
extremely remote; the threat was perceived in terms of a potential attack on 
New Zealand’s allies. 
In public, Wellington was always a loyal and outspoken supporter of 
US policies in Asia and even acted as Washington’s proxy at the United 
Nations in raising resolutions criticising the PRC. But, behind closed doors, 
New Zealand politicians and officials argued that US policies towards the 
PRC were having a negative affect on relationships with other countries in 
Asia. New Zealand’s concerns were frequently raised in inter-allies internal 
meetings and confidential reports within the New Zealand government.  
The New Zealand perspective was that peace in the Asia-Pacific would 
only be achieved if a modus vivendi could be worked out with the PRC—one 
which would welcome the new nation into the international community, 
rather than excluding it. Nevertheless, the realities of the situation were such 
that New Zealand could only recognise the PRC if the US changed its 
position on the regime; to have done otherwise could have seriously damaged 
New Zealand’s relations with the US and other Western allies. Under the 
circumstances, the best that successive New Zealand governments could do 
was to maintain a tolerant attitude to unofficial New Zealand-PRC activities 
and attempt to influence US-China policies from within the alliance system.  
 
 
New Zealand Establishes Diplomatic Relations with the PRC 
 
The Sino-US rapprochement in 1971 brought about the opportunity to change 
New Zealand’s official relations with the PRC. The initial response of the 
then Holyoake government was to propose a “two Chinas” approach, 
whereby both the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China 
could be recognised internationally.29 This approach was rejected by both the 
PRC and the ROC.30 It took the election of a new Labour government in late 
1972 to take the step of recognising the PRC and breaking off relations with 
                                           
28 “Threats to Security in New Zealand,” Cabinet Advisory Committee on Security, 28 
January 1952, PM 84/31/3/, part 1, NA. 
29 “New Zealand and China,” New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review, May 1971, p. 3. 
30 John Scott, “Recognising China,” in Malcolm McKinnon ed., New Zealand in World 
Affairs, Vol. 2, 1957-1972, Wellington: NZIIA, 1991, p. 240. 
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the ROC. Official relations between New Zealand and the PRC were 
established on 22 December 1972, in some haste. New Zealand did not want 
to be seen to be lagging behind the newly-elected Australian Labour 
administration, which had promised to make the recognition of the PRC the 
first act of its new government.31  
The establishment of diplomatic relations with the PRC marked the 
beginning of a new phase both in New Zealand-China relations and in New 
Zealand foreign policy in general. In 1972, there was a common view among 
local academics and diplomats that New Zealand had followed US foreign 
policy on China too closely for the last twenty years. But these criticisms are 
somewhat unfair. In the Cold War era, as the foreign affairs archives now 
reveal, New Zealand was far from unquestioning of US foreign policy and 
constantly tried to represent its own point of view and approach to 
international affairs. It did so, however, in terms of working within the 
framework of its alliance system, rather than outside it.  
 
 
1972-1984 “Political” Relationship 
 
Despite the haste of the Kirk Labour government in establishing diplomatic 
relations with the PRC in 1972, the administration was cautious and slow in 
exploring how the relationship might develop beyond formal contacts.32 
Similarly, China in 1972 was still in the grip of the Cultural Revolution and 
there was considerable internal disagreement on foreign policy issues.33 In 
these early years, New Zealand and the PRC had little in common beyond a 
shared opposition towards the encroachment of Soviet power into the Asia-
Pacific and the fact that both countries shared a tactical alliance with the 
United States. They had many differences in foreign policy terms but only 
two were stressed: New Zealand’s criticism of China’s foreign policy in 
Southeast Asia, and their opposition to China’s nuclear testing. Though these 
concerns were regularly raised in bilateral meetings in this period, the 
difference of views on the two issues did not have an impact on the 
                                           
31 Scott, “Recognising China,” pp. 249-50. 
32 John McKinnon discusses this period in some detail in “Breaking the Mould: New 
Zealand’s Relations with China,” in Bruce Brown ed., New Zealand in World Affairs 
1972-1990, Wellington: Victoria University of Wellington Press, 1990, pp. 231-232. 
33 For more on the topic of Chinese foreign policy in the early 1970s see Fred Teiwes and 
Warren Sun, The End of the Maoist Era: Chinese Politics During the Twilight of the 
Cultural Revolution, 1972-1976, Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2007; and Ma Jisen, 
The Cultural Revolution in the Foreign Ministry of China, Hong Kong: The Chinese 
University Press, 2004.  
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developing relationship.34 The collective strategic goal of anti-Sovietism was 
the focus of a relationship which, from both the New Zealand and Chinese 
sides, was described as essentially “political”.35 The New Zealand Embassy 
in Beijing summed up this view in its annual report of 1973. The report stated 
that China valued the relationship with New Zealand more for Wellington’s 
links with Southeast Asia than for their ties with Britain, the US, or Japan. In 
a parallel to the diplomatic rivalry which would later develop between China 
and Taiwan in the South Pacific, New Zealand diplomats surmised that 
China’s main aim in Southeast Asia was to keep the Soviet Union out. 
However, it was noted at the time that China did not seem to take much 
interest in the South Pacific.36 
During the visit of New Zealand Prime Minister Robert Muldoon to 
China in 1980, leaders focused on a topic of common concern to both 
governments; the spread of Soviet influence in the Asia-Pacific region. 
Muldoon and his counterpart Deng Xiaoping exchanged views on shared 
concerns about security in the Asia-Pacific region, the Soviet Union and 
Vietnam’s involvement in Cambodia, and the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan.37 Astonishingly, given his profound anti-Communism, Prime 
Minister Muldoon told Deng Xiaoping that “any support China could give to 
the island states of the [Pacific] Forum whether political or economic would 
help maintain political stability in the South Pacific and make it very difficult 
for Soviet penetration to take place.”38 Muldoon’s invitation to Beijing to 
extend its diplomatic and strategic rivalries into our part of the world set up a 
pattern for China’s interactions in the South Pacific region, and the negative 
effects are still being felt today. 
In time, trade links would begin to overshadow the political 
relationship. Yet politics were never far from the expansion or reduction of 
trade. In the year that New Zealand established diplomatic recognition of the 
PRC, Chinese traders had virtually stopped buying from New Zealand and 
exports to China were a mere NZ$1.7 million. In the late 1960s, Beijing had 
punished New Zealand for its anti-PRC posturing at the United Nations by 
restricting trade. However, only 18 months after diplomatic recognition, the 
PRC came close to becoming New Zealand’s second most important market 
in Asia. Trade with China, both then and now, is very dependent on the 
                                           
34 McKinnon, “Breaking the Mould,” pp. 233-234; 236. China ended support to Southeast 
Asian insurgent groups after 1979 and it signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 
1997. 
35 McKinnon, p. 232. 
36 New Zealand Embassy, Beijing, “China in 1973,” 24 December 1973, PM 26/3/1, NA. 
37 “Muldoon Visit to China,” 18 November 1980, 59/264/11, MFAT. 
38  “Notes from R.D. Muldoon, Prime Minister, meeting with Deng Xiaoping,” 
13 September 1980, 59/264/11, MFAT. 
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attitude of the New Zealand government to Beijing and its strategic 
preoccupations.  
In 1975, diplomats argued that it was necessary to “stimulate [the] 
interest of China in New Zealand from time to time, in order to keep up [the] 
expansion of trade.”39 This has now become standard wisdom on New 
Zealand-China trade. After New Zealand established diplomatic relations 
with China, an extensive programme of official exchanges was set up which 
included educational, cultural, scientific, sporting, arts, medical, journalism, 
mountaineering, and trade-related contacts. The initial goal of these 
programmes was to enhance awareness about New Zealand among Chinese 
political leaders and the Chinese population. In 1978, New Zealand was the 
first country to accord China “developing country” status for trading 
purposes. This meant that Chinese imports received special lower tariff rates 
aimed at helping to ease the trade imbalance between the two countries, 
which was overwhelmingly in New Zealand’s favour in the 1970s and 
1980s.40  
 
 
1984-1989 New Zealand and China’s “Special” Relationship 
 
With the election of the fourth Labour government in 1984, the pace of New 
Zealand-China relations stepped up as the new government saw hope for 
expanding export markets in the rapidly expanding Chinese economy. The 
Labour government made trade the dominant element of its foreign policy, 
and emphasised this in 1988 by changing the name of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs to the Ministry of External Relations and Trade (later this would be 
adjusted to the current title Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade). Asia, and 
in particular China, was seen as an obvious market for New Zealand 
products.  
Talk of a “special relationship” with China was common during the 
term of the Labour government, particularly in the period 1985-1987. 
According to the then Ambassador to China, Lindsay Watt, there was 
euphoria in government circles at the amount of attention China seemed to be 
paying to New Zealand.41 The New Zealand-China Friendship Society took 
pains to link the idea of New Zealand’s “special relationship” with China to 
Rewi Alley’s groundwork, and urged New Zealand companies to recognise 
this by supporting Alley’s own projects in China.42 
                                           
39 “China: Bilateral Exchanges in 1976,” 30 October 1975, PM 59/264/1 part 1, NA. 
40 Report of the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee, “Inquiry into the New Zealand-
China Relationship,” p. 23. 
41 Lindsay Watt, interview, 21 January 1993. 
42 Karen Gieseg, “Rewi Alley’s Goodwill Paves Way for China Trade, Companies Urged 
to Show Thanks,” Evening Post, 29 August 1987. 
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The Chinese government was certainly very interested in the election 
of the Labour government in 1984. The basis for such interest may be seen in 
a number of articles published in Chinese policy journals noting the Labour 
government’s firm stance against apartheid, the anti-nuclear policy, attempts 
to improve relations with Third World countries, assertion of New Zealand’s 
responsibilities as a South Pacific country to the other small island states of 
the South Pacific, determination to make trade a fundamental aspect of New 
Zealand diplomacy and last, but not least, a firm commitment to developing 
friendly relations with the PRC.43 A further group of articles published in the 
mid to late 1980s illustrate why New Zealand’s commitment to cooperation 
in the Asia-Pacific region was of interest to China. The articles underline 
China’s new focus on forging regional cooperation in the Asia-Pacific. 
Beijing hoped to develop regional unity in Asia and the Pacific, as a counter 
to US and Soviet power. China saw itself as a natural leader of such a bloc.44 
It was in China’s interest, as much as it was in New Zealand’s, to maintain 
the idea that there was a “special relationship” between the two countries. 
What New Zealanders dealing with China did not seem to realise at the time 
was that, in the 1980s, China claimed a “special relationship” with virtually 
every country with which it had diplomatic relations. Not only that, the much 
vaunted “friendship” between the two peoples was a standard term in China’s 
diplomatic vocabulary.45  
Nonetheless, though China’s relationship with New Zealand may not 
have been as “special” as New Zealanders liked to think it was, the Chinese 
market had certainly become very important to New Zealand by the mid to 
late 1980s. By 1985, exports to China had reached an all time high of 
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NZ$298.2 million. In that year, China was New Zealand’s largest buyer for 
wool and the eighth largest export market overall. In 1986, the New Zealand 
Parliament’s Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee (then chaired by New 
Zealand’s current Prime Minister, Helen Clark), held an inquiry into the New 
Zealand-China relationship and predicted that the long-term prospects for 
expansion of commercial and other links were extremely good.46 The late 
1980s was a period of enormous optimism about the potential for expanding 
New Zealand-China relations. 
 
 
1989 Post-Tiananmen Re-think of the Relationship 
 
The pro-democracy movement that culminated in the violent crackdown of 
4 June 1989 had a significant impact on popular and official impressions of 
New Zealand-China relations. The New Zealand government openly 
criticised China for its actions in June 1989, and there was strong public 
debate on the issue of whether the “special relationship” rhetoric had blinded 
New Zealand from looking more critically at problems and differences 
between the two countries. In August 1989, a discussion paper on New 
Zealand-China relations written by diplomats at the New Zealand Embassy in 
Beijing reflected on the anti-China debate within New Zealand and in the 
West and concluded that “the violent reaction from outside comes from the 
fact that the last ten years created an image of a good China. Then suddenly it 
turned bad. If we are honest, wishful thinking about China let us down.”47 
From this period on, New Zealand politicians and officials talked less of a 
“special relationship” and the “Rewi Alley connection” (he had died in 1987) 
and focused more on practical issues, such as increasing trade. The events of 
1989 served to restore New Zealand-China official relations to a more 
pragmatic basis than had been the case during the “China fever” of the 1980s.  
 
 
1989-1995 “Pragmatic” Relationship 
 
The events of June 1989 and the end of the Cold War led to a dramatic shift 
in Western perceptions of China. For a time, the PRC became an 
international pariah. In the early to mid-1990s, China was no longer seen as 
an ally of the West and, after the Soviet coup, was no longer needed as an 
ally of the West. There was relentless international condemnation of China’s 
human rights abuses in this period. As the Chinese military engaged in a 
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rapid modernisation process, the US Pentagon began to regard China as a 
military threat. Furthermore, the general assumption among New Zealand’s 
closest allies in the early to mid 1990s was that the CCP government was 
going to fall. New Zealand’s own diplomatic analysis tended to agree with 
this. A 1992 report from the Beijing Embassy speculated (wrongly as it 
turned out), that “the chances of weak politicians such as Jiang Zemin and Li 
Peng remaining in power for long in the post-Deng succession struggle 
period must be very small.”48 A report from New Zealand’s Washington 
Embassy after a meeting with the head of the US State Department’s China, 
Mongolia, and Tibet Bureau concluded, somewhat pessimistically, that, 
“Deng is betting against history.”49 
Nonetheless, despite the diplomats’ predictions that the PRC was 
doomed, in public New Zealand took a positive attitude towards the regime 
and made a point of distinguishing itself from the US and Australia, who 
were more openly critical. Whatever views were held privately about China’s 
political system, it was recognised that, “we can not get to first base 
economically if we do not get the political relationship right (there are clear 
instances of Chinese [officials] checking with the Foreign Ministry or the 
Premier’s office about the appropriateness of dealing with New Zealand).”50 
The result of such pragmatism was that New Zealand-China trade grew 
steadily in the early 1990s, while educational and other such ties continued to 
expand. However, it should be noted that in this period the ROC (Taiwan) 
was still significantly more important to New Zealand in trade and 
investment terms, and as a source of tourists and migrants. In 1995, Taiwan 
was New Zealand’s sixth most important trading partner, while the PRC 
came seventh.51 
 
 
1995-2003 Finding Common Ground 
 
In 1995, as a result of the US Congress facilitating ROC President Lee Teng-
hui’s visit to the US, US-China relations were at an all-time low. This was 
also the period when theories about the “China threat” began to feature 
prominently in debate within policy-making circles in Washington. However, 
in this era, as in the Cold War years, New Zealand officials and politicians 
tended to take a different position from those of our close allies on relations 
with the PRC. New Zealand-China political relations actually became even 
                                           
48 Memo, New Zealand Embassy Beijing-MFAT, 29 October 1992, 82/1/1 Volume 12, 
MFAT. 
49 Memo, New Zealand Embassy Washington-MFAT, 11 November 1992, 82/1/1 Volume 
12, MFAT.  
50 New Zealand Embassy Beijing-MFAT, 8 March 1991, 7-8, 82/1/1 Volume 12, MFAT. 
51 “Taiwan Information Paper,” April 1996, 84/1/18 part 2, MFAT. 
New Zealand-China Relations 
 
15 
 
warmer from this period on, as New Zealand again took a critical view of US 
policies towards China and sought to distance itself from them. A 1995 New 
Zealand Embassy report on China-US relations asserted, “US policy towards 
China lacks consistency. To a large extent it is being driven by domestic 
political imperatives. New Zealand does not face the same constraints, and 
will not necessarily find it an advantage to pursue its interests in China in 
close association with the US.”52   
With the election of the Clark Labour government in 1999, New 
Zealand found even more common ground with China on international 
political issues. Both countries were opposed to the US invasion of Iraq. 
However, in 2003, New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark revealed some 
latent apprehension about China’s rise when she stated in an interview with 
The Guardian that (among other reasons) she opposed the Iraq War because 
it set a precedent of large powers ignoring the United Nations and 
international law. She used China as an example of exactly to whom this 
might set a bad example. Prime Minister Clark stated that “this is a century 
which is going to see China emerge as the largest economy, and usually with 
economic power comes military clout. In the world we are constructing, we 
want to know [that the system] will work whoever is the biggest and the most 
powerful.”53 Clark’s comments were consistent with a persistent theme in 
New Zealand’s relations with the PRC since 1972; the theme of encouraging 
and supporting the PRC’s entry and active involvement in international 
organisations.54 From the perspective of a small state such as New Zealand, a 
strong international system is the best means to secure regional security and 
global peace.   
Trade, education, and tourism relations expanded dramatically in this 
period as China engaged in the rapid opening up of its economy and contacts 
with the outside world. From the mid-1990s, the PRC also became a major 
source of new migrants to New Zealand. This (along with a rise in 
immigration from Taiwan, Hong Kong and South Korea) aroused unease in 
some circles and a few journalists even talked of an “Asian invasion”. From 
late 1997, New Zealand’s policies on exporting education coincided with the 
rise of the middle class in China and large numbers of Chinese students 
began coming to study in New Zealand on short-term visas. In 1997, New 
Zealand was the first Western country to sign off on the bilateral paperwork 
which led to China being accepted into the WTO. In 1999, China’s National 
Tourism Administration made New Zealand an approved tourism destination 
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for Chinese tour groups.55 From 1999, the numbers of visitor visas the New 
Zealand Immigration Service issued to PRC passport holders began to 
increase rapidly, year after year.  
 
 
2004-Present “Bedrock” Relationship 
 
2004 was the year when New Zealand and China began negotiations to 
develop a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the two countries. At the 
same time, New Zealand also formally recognised China as a market 
economy. Once again, New Zealand was the first Western country to do so 
with China. This led to much talk of New Zealand being distinctive for 
having the “three firsts” with China. In 2005, Prime Minister Helen Clark 
told People’s Daily that New Zealand was “the first developed country to 
conclude a bilateral market access agreement with China for its entry to the 
World Trade Organization; the first to recognise China’s status as a market 
economy and the first country to enter FTA negotiations with China.” Ms 
Clark said New Zealand was hoping to conclude a fourth first; to be the first 
developed country to conclude a FTA agreement with China.56 Strangely, no 
one promoted the fact that in 1978 we had also been the first developed 
country to accord China “developing country” status for trade purposes. Nor 
did anyone mention that New Zealand had a further, and even earlier, first 
with China when, in 1963, the Communist Party of New Zealand was the 
first (and only) Western communist party to take the Chinese side in the 
Sino-Soviet split. The hyperbole about “firsts” in this era was simply part of 
Wellington’s ongoing strategy, stated in the 1975 dictum as being to 
“stimulate the interest of China in New Zealand in order to keep up the 
expansion of trade.” 
Also in 2004, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade released an 
update on New Zealand’s most important diplomatic relationships.57 Six 
countries or territories were designated as “bedrock” relationships for New 
Zealand, meaning that they were the most important. The first five were 
unremarkable: Australia, the US, Japan, the European Union, and the South 
Pacific Forum countries; but adding China to the list was new. Designating 
China as a bedrock relationship indicated that, whatever the differences in 
system between the two countries, and differences of view on certain issues, 
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the growing importance of China internationally and the strength of China’s 
market meant that it was now more essential than ever before that New 
Zealand maintained a positive and dynamic relationship with that country. 
This did not imply a turning away from New Zealand’s traditional allies, but 
it did suggest that New Zealand’s politicians and diplomats believed that the 
global system followed a very different order than that of the Cold War years. 
Recognising the importance of China to New Zealand was a pragmatic and 
public acknowledgement of those changed realities.  
Though the public emphasis on China as one of New Zealand’s key 
foreign relationships was new, the topic had in fact been analysed by New 
Zealand diplomats at length, from the early 1990s on, in a series of in-depth 
reports. Each report concluded that China was currently very important to 
New Zealand and in the future would likely become more important to us 
than our former allies, the US and the UK. However, as many of the reports 
noted, the problem with the growing importance of China to New Zealand 
was that the New Zealand population was not yet ready to accept China’s 
dominant role in our region and growing influence in our society.58 This 
problem has not gone away, despite the efforts of the Asia-New Zealand 
Foundation and other agencies to educate the New Zealand population about 
contemporary China and to change traditional (and more recent) stereotypes 
and prejudices about Chinese people in New Zealand.59  
The tension between government policies of drawing New Zealand 
ever-closer to China and the New Zealand public’s ability to adjust to the 
implications of these policies looks likely to become ever more acute, as New 
Zealand’s economic and political interests are increasingly affected by, and 
may at times clash with, this new close relationship. Contemporary popular 
concerns range from anxiety about the role and activities of the PRC in the 
South Pacific and the political costs of its diplomatic rivalry with Taiwan, as 
well as worries about the activities of the Chinese Diaspora in the Pacific;60 
anxiety that New Zealand’s growing closeness with China is preventing the 
government from speaking out to protect the interest of New Zealanders 
involved in activities China frowns on, such as the religious group 
                                           
58 “Greater China: Review of Representation Five Years Out,” 15 September 1993, 
58/264/1 part 43; China-US and New Zealand Interests,” 17 February 1995; 84/12/1 
part 3; “A New Zealand Strategy for China,” 21 August 1996, 58/264/1 volume 39; “New 
Zealand and China: Looking Ahead,” 1996, 58/264/1 volume 40; New Zealand Embassy, 
Beijing, “China: High Level Contact,” 13 January 1997, 58/264/1 volume 41; MFAT. 
59 Yvonne Martin, “Asian Students Falling Prey to Violent Racists,” 3 April 2004, 
http://www.stuff.co.nz. 
60 Michael Field, “China Behind Paradigm Shift in South Pacific,” 
http://www.michaelfield.org/regional6.htm and Michael Field, “Currency of Persuasion,” 
New Zealand Listener, 7-13 May 2005. 
  Brady 
 
18 
 
Falungong; 61  fear that the FTA will be detrimental to New Zealand’s 
manufacturing sector;62 and social anxiety about issues such as violent crimes 
involving Chinese overseas students and drug smuggling linked to China.63 
China’s new role as a major Pacific power and its potential to become 
the dominant power in the region poses a challenge for New Zealand. Unlike 
in the past, when New Zealand worked with Great Britain and the US as the 
dominant powers, New Zealand does not have a framework of shared 
assumptions and common political experiences with China to draw upon in 
developing a subsidiary relationship with that country. Nor do we have a 
shared alliance structure to work out differences behind closed doors while 
retaining outward unity on common goals. In the Cold War era, New Zealand 
was able to take opposing positions to those of our allies, yet still be regarded 
as a loyal member of the alliance.64 However, China and New Zealand have 
been moulded by very different political cultures; and the role of “loyal 
opposition” does not yet have a place in the Chinese polity.  
From China’s perspective, New Zealand is small and insignificant. It 
does not need New Zealand’s support or trade. Dependence on the Chinese 
market is likely to affect our political leverage with Beijing, because trade is 
political for China—a boon that can be granted or withdrawn—depending on 
the warmth of the bilateral relationship. If New Zealand challenges China on 
an issue that it regards as crucial, Beijing is likely to respond by removing 
trade and other privileges.65 Because of this, New Zealand officials are 
cautious to avoid offending Chinese sensibilities, but they must be equally 
vigilant in upholding New Zealand’s traditional commitments to human 
rights, free speech and freedom of association.  
Chinese diplomacy has two sayings which are relevant here: “seek 
common points and set aside differences” (qiu tong cun yi) and “seek 
common points, face up to differences” (qiu tong li yi).66 New Zealand’s 
foreign policy on China has had a strong tradition of following the latter 
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approach, as was shown during the Cold War era when New Zealand spoke 
out against the prevailing views of its allies on the question of the recognition 
of the PRC, and followed an independent path on policies relating to contacts 
with Beijing in the same period. Similarly, in the 1970s and the early 1980s, 
when the focus on New Zealand-China relations was on politics, not trade, 
New Zealand criticised China for its involvement in guerrilla insurgencies in 
Southeast Asia and its continued nuclear-testing programme. However, 
somewhat disturbingly, now that the focus on New Zealand-China relations 
(from the New Zealand perspective at least) has moved to trade, the New 
Zealand government appears less and less willing to face up to differences 
with China. From the 1999 visit of Chinese President Jiang Zemin, when 
New Zealand police moved tourist buses in front of anti-China protesters to 
avoid the Chinese delegation coming into contact with them;67 or the 2003 
visit of Chinese President Hu Jintao, when he was similarly segregated from 
protesters during a trip to the Auckland Museum;68 to April 2007 when, at the 
request of the Chinese Embassy, the New Zealand police removed an ethnic 
Chinese parliamentary reporter who was alleged to be a Falungong follower 
from the New Zealand parliament in advance of the visit of a senior Chinese 
politician;69 Wellington appears to be taking a much more timid approach in 
dealing with problems related to China than they previously did, and continue 
to do with our formerly close allies, the United States or Great Britain. The 
key challenge ahead for New Zealand will be to find a way to come to terms 
with China as the dominant power in our region, while at the same time 
maintaining our own traditions and independent foreign policy.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The reasons behind New Zealand’s current close interest in China and desire 
to expand its relations are multiple and deep-seated. New Zealand-China ties 
developed long before the current period and unofficial connections have 
often been stronger than official and political ones. In the current period, 
New Zealand’s political, economic, cultural, social and even military links 
with China are strong and developing in a positive direction. New Zealand’s 
multiple connections with China are more diverse than at any other time in 
our history. 
For this reason, as New Zealand was the first Western country to 
conclude FTA talks with the PRC, and as the two countries’ official linkages 
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grow closer year by year, it would be wise to check that public attitudes in 
New Zealand towards China keep pace with the changes in the relationship. 
In some cases, increased recognition from Beijing of the genuineness of these 
concerns and a willingness to address them will go some way to soothing 
public unease. However, the New Zealand government still needs to do a lot 
more to prepare the New Zealand population to accept China’s status as a 
dominant power in our region, the Asia-Pacific. New Zealand’s national 
interests are best served by maintaining a peaceful Pacific and working in 
cooperation with the dominant powers.  
Despite the many differences between the two societies, New Zealand 
and China have sustained a rich and complex relationship for more than 200 
years. If the experiences of our past interactions are any predictor of the 
future, regardless of the ups and downs our allies may experience in their 
relations with Beijing, New Zealand seems likely to continue to develop a 
constructive, mutually-beneficial relationship with China for many years to 
come. For a small country like New Zealand, dependent on establishing 
positive relationships with the major powers, whoever they may be, this is a 
matter of political survival. This is even more likely if we can continue to 
maintain the principle of “looking for common points” at the same time as 
“facing up to differences.”  
